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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - NATIONAL SERVICE LIFE
INSURANCE - DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN THE FIELD OF GOVERNMENTAL COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISE
I
The rule of law enunciating the principle that the United States
may not be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its agents and that
such agents may not waive the rights of the United States has recently
been invoked in the case of United States v. Fitch.' The basis of this
principle is founded on the broader concept that the sovereign may not
be sued without its consent 2 and where consent is given, the statute
will be strictly construed3 so as not to broaden the field of government
liability beyond the express consent of the legislature. Many of the
District Courts have shown a tendency to apply the doctrine of waiver
and estoppel against the government, but in most cases have been
reversed upon the application of this ancient doctrine of sovereign
immunity.4 In this contemporary era of paternalism in which the gov-
ernment has extended the scope of its activities so as to include busi-
ness ventures heretofore reserved to private enterprise, an important
issue is squarely placed before the courts. Where the United States,
through agencies and government corporations, enters the field of
commercial transactions, should the laws and decisions governing pri-
vate enterprises be applicable to the government?
II
While there is no constitutional provision which forbids a suit
against the United States5 without its consent, the principle that "the
1 185 F. (2d) 471 (10th Cir., 1950). The insured under a national service life
insurance policy, allowed the policy to lapse for non-payment of premiums.
He mailed a letter to the Veterans Administrator enclosing premiums for
two months but failed to send a statement as to the condition of his health.
The Administrator stated that it would be applied to the account of the in-
sured in accordance with the law and regulations pertaining thereto. No
question was raised as to the health statement required by the regulations in
effect. 38 CODE FED. REGs. §§10.3422, 10.3423, 10.3424 (Cum. Supp. 1946). The
lower court found that the insured was in better health when the premiums
were received than he was when the insurance lapsed for non-payment of
premiums. The Circuit Court of Appeals denied recovery on the policy alleged
to be in force, holding that no policy was in effect at the date of the death of
the insured and the Veterans Administration rightfully denied reinstatement.
2 Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 27 S. Ct. 388, 51 L. Ed. 510 (1907).
See also 54 Am. Jur. 634 and cases collected therein.
3 Wilson v. United States, 70 F. (2d) 176, 179 (10th cir., 1934).
4 Infra, note 20.
5 The Eleventh Amendment of the U. S. Constitution is limited to an action
against a state brought by a citizen of another state or by citizens or subjects
of a foreign state.
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courts have no jurisdiction over such action" 6 forecloses the possibility
of such suits.7 Various reasons have been assigned for the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, many of them being of historical importance
only. The idea that a government should not be made to suffer the in-
conveniences and indignities of a suit by one of its citizens s seems to
be insubstantial in view of the express consent to sue the government
granted by congress in many instances.9 The reasoning of Justice
Holmes, apparently influenced by the political writings of Thomas
Hobbes, led to this conclusion:
"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends."'1
This reasoning appears to lack force in view of the prevelant
political philosophy of this country that sovereignty resides most com-
completely in the people and not in any government. Holmes' argu-
mentation is probably a corallary of the maxim that "the King can
do no wrong" which was a popular theory in, and a consequence of,
English Jurisprudence."' Sovereignty was said to reside in the King
by reason of his dignity, and since the laws were dependent on his
prerogative, he was not subject to them. However, it is difficult to
ascertain exactly where sovereignty resides, under the United States
government of limited, delegated powers. Certainly all three branches
of the government are limited by the U.S. Constitution, and each
state has surrendered some portion of sovereignty as a member of
the union.12 The only alternative appears to be that sovereignty reposes
in the people.' 3 If this be the case, the conclusion of Holmes appears
unsatisfactory.
6 Kansas v. United States, supra, note 2.
7 Art. III Sec. 2 Cl. 1 of the U. S. Constitution extends the judicial power to
"Controversies to which the United States shall be a party." This article
would be sufficient to support a court holding that a suit may be maintained
against the United States. However, by reason of the established doctrine
of sovereign immunity, this clause is limited to suits in which the United
States is the party plaintiff. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 573, 53
S. Ct. 751, 77 L. Ed. 1372 (1933).8 In Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505, 8 S. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216 (1887).
9 E.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 1346 (b). ". . . the district
courts . .. shall have jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages .... for injury or loss of property or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or ommission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable...".10 Kawananokoa v. Polybank, 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 S. Ct. 526, 51 L. Ed. 834
• (1907).
11I BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 239.12 United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 12 S. Ct. 488, 36 L. Ed. 285 (1892).
13 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886). "In
our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of govern-
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Perhaps the only meritorious argument lies not in theory but rather
in practical considerations, entailing the interference with the function-
ing of government.1 4 But this is an insufficient premise for applying
the immunity doctrine indiscriminately. That doctrine ought to be
limited in this wise: A government should not be subject to suits
without its consent where such suits or the threat of such suits would
unduly interfere with the primary functioning of government. Such
a rule cannot be applied without first determining the extent of the
primary functions of government. The question might well be asked,
"Does a government agency or corporation engaged in the business
of insurance fall within the scope of primary governmental functions ?"
The answer to this, if any existing injustices are to be remedied, should
not be dependent upon the subjective norm of the prevelant political
theory existing at the time. If it were, the further problem of deter-
mining what this theory is at a certain period of time would serve
as a valid objection to its adoption. A more realistic approach to the
problem necessitates the adoption of a more objective standard. A
government agency or corporation engaged in a business which by its
nature involves commercial transactions is not within the primary
function of government. The adoption of this standard would indicate
that the doctrine of soverign immunity would apply only to cases in
which first, there was an interference with the functioning of the
government and second, this function was of a non commercial nature.
This rule would remove cases involving national service life insurance
from the purview of the immunity doctrine and these cases would be
decided according to the laws and decisions applicable to private
insurance companies. As a result, the rules of waiver and estoppel
would apply to the United States. Similarly, those corporations dis-
charging government functions which are commercial in nature and
which the legislature has authorized to sue and be sued would be
subject to the rules of waiver and estoppel.'15
ment, sovereignty itself remains with the people by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts."
1423 So. CAL. L. REv. 258, 260.
Is Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion. Under the rule advocated here these corporations listed would not have
recourse to the immunity doctrine because by their nature they are involved
in commercial transactions. Although it may appear to be a moot question
as to whether government corporations and agencies would be included in the
rule contended for, particularly in situations in which congress has consented
to their suing and being sued, the fact remains that the government, under
the present rule, may withdraw its consent at any time. White v. United
States, 270 U. S. 175, 46 S. Ct. 274, 70 L. Ed. 530 (1926). A more important
reason for their inclusion is the fact that the doctrine of waiver and estoppel
applicable to private companies is not applicable to the government corpora-
tions listed. Cf. infra, note 29.
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While the doctrine of sovereign imunity could be narrowed or re-
stricted without the aid of a statute,' the courts seem to be intrigued
by the antiquity of it and have uniformly held that the "sovereign"'--
may not be sued without its consent. From this the courts concluded
that when congress authorizes suits against the government, this con-
sent will be strictly construed in favor of the government' and the
doctrine of waiver or estoppel will not be applied. 19 The adherence
to the rigid rule of sovereign immunity and the consequential injustices
resulting therefrom have led some federal district courts to apply
essentially the rule advocated here, but have met with little success.
20
Some circuit courts have expressed an implied disfavor with the results
attained under the rule but thus far have failed to grant relief. Various
reasons have been assigned. In Birmingham v. United States2 ' the
court held that "no officer or employer of the government can... bind
the government to any waivers, express or implied." This court also
laid down the rule that where the government did not enter the field
of business in the accepted sense for commercial purposes and pecuni-
ary gain, it does not stand in the same position as ordinary insurance
companies.22 While the rule may be the basis for distinction in this
field, the test applied seems wholly inadequate, being based upon the
motives of the government for entering a particular business field. It
may be unprejudically stated that at no time is pecuniary gain the
prime factor in the government's entering a commercial field. Other
reasons, for example, re-development, or promotion of commerce
among the states,23 are greater motivating factors. In United States v.
16 Supra, note 6.
17 The idea that the United States is a sovereign in the sense that the word sov-
ereign was used to support the English rule concerning the non-suability of
the king is open to question. Cf. supra, note 12.
Is Wilson v. United States, supra, note 3; Bryan v. United States, 99 F. (2d)
549, 552 (10th cir., 1938).
19 Wilbur National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 55 S. Ct. 362, 79 L. Ed.
798 (1934).
20 The district court in Wilbur National Bank v. United States, supra, note 19,
said: "If the defendant (United States) was a private insurance company, I
would have no hesitancy in declaring it estopped from claiming the policy had
lapsed for non-payment of premium .... The same principle should be ap-
plied against the defendant (United States) in this case." See also, United
States v. Fitch, supra, note 1.
214 F. (2d) 508 (8th cir., 1925). Insured's war risk insurance policy lapsed on
March 31, 1919. On July 2, 1919 the insured died and the due notice of death
was given by the beneficiary. After the notice, the beneficiary was notified
of an arrearage which was forwarded and was received by the Veteran'%
Bureau. The beneficiary pleaded that the United States waived the prompt
payment of the premiums.
22 To the same effect is White v. United States, supra, note 15. "The insurance
was a contract, for which'a premium was paid, but it was not one entered into
by the United States for gain."2 3 Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 529, 14 S. Ct 891, 38 L. Ed.
808 (1894).
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Tyke 24 the court stated that a war risk insurance contract is not a
business contract. It is a "relation of benevolence, established by the
government at considerable cost to itself, for the soldier's good." If
motive is to remain the test in determining the extent of government
liability, it is respectfully submitted that no business undertaking by
the government can be immune from the nonsuability doctrine. This
was evidenced in the case of United States v. Loveland 5 where the
court categorically stated:
"When the government broadened its field of operation to new
fields, it did not thereby broaden the power of those it employed
in such new fields to the extent of allowing them, by acts of
neglect or ommission, to commit the government to liabilities in
such fields which they had no power to do in other spheres of
government activity."
This statement appears to be contrary to the test laid down by Justice
Holmes in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.26
"When the United States went into the insurance business,
issued policies in familiar form and provided that in case of
disagreement it might be sued, it must be asumed to have ac-
cepted the ordinary incidents of suits in such business."
However, this case has not been followed as an authority governing
war risk insurance.21 The decision in Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C.2" was
a recent step toward a liberal construction of a statute creating govern-
ment corporations. The R.F.C. was authorized to charter a Regional
Agricultural Credit Corp. Neither the statute authorizing this nor the
charter explicitly rendered the Credit Corporation amenable to suit.
Among the corporate powers granted to the R.F.C. was the power to
sue and be sued. The court held that the Credit Corporation's liability
to suit was to be inferred from the numerous instances in which con-
gress has authorized suits against government corporations. The court
also remarked, "Congress may, of course, endow a governmental cor-
poration with the government's immunity. But always the question
is: has it done so?" The question as to whether a government cor-
24 19 F. (2d) 876 (9th cir., 1927). The facts were concerned with the payment
of interest by the United States. The court stated, "It is a settled rule that,
in the absence of a stipulation to pay interest, or a statute allowing it, none
can be recovered against the United States upon unpaid accounts or claims."
citing United States v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 169, 41 St. Ct. 281, 65 L. Ed. 566(1921).
2525 F. (2d) 447 (3d cir., 1927).
26267 U. S. 76, 45 S. Ct. 211, 69 L. Ed. 519 (1925). The insured held two policies
issued by the government insuring a ship and its freight against war risks. The
Supreme Court affirmed a district court decree awarded against the United
States. The statement of the court was made in reference to the lower court's
decree awarding interest against the United States.
27 Sternfield v. United States, 32 F. (2d) 789 (D.C., N.Y.) (1929), citing Birm-
ingham v. United States. supra, note 21, United States v. Lyke, supra, note 24.
s 306 U. S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939).
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poration partakes of government immunity, unless congress consents
to its being sued appears to be decided in the negative. The problem,
however, still remains: does the doctrine of waiver or estoppel apply
in cases involving governmental agencies and corporations? The an-
swer to this was stated in Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Mer-
rill et al.29 The government empowered a corporation to insure wheat
farmers against crop losses. Regulations specifying the conditions on
which it would insure wheat crops were published in the Federal
Register, and included was a provision making spring wheat which
had been reseeded on winter wheat acreage ineligible for insurance.
The plaintiff farmer applied for insurance, informing the local agent
that his wheat was being reseeded in winter wheat acreage and the
local agent advised him that the crop was insurable. The corporation
accepted the application subject to the terms of its regulations. In
this suit to recover on the policy for loss of the crop, the court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Here the court assumed
that recovery could be had against a private insurance company.
"It is too late in the day to urge that the government is just an-
other private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability,
whenever it takes over a business heretofore conducted by private
enterprise or engages in competition with private ventures."3 0
It would appear that fair dealing concerning the interrelation of the
United States and its citizens should be essential. If this were true,
the government in the crop insurance case would be bound by the con-
tract, i.e., the written application and the policy issued. But the court
sustains its position by superimposing the regulations upon the rela-
tionship of the parties. In order to sustain their position, the court,
impliedly at least, held that after the local agent advised the farmer
that the crop was insurable the farmer was bound-1. to know that
regulations of the corporation existed; 2. to read these voluminous
regulations; 3. to understand them and their technical applications. It
goes without saying that this is undoubtedly requiring too much of the
citizenry. To fulfill these requirements, it is doubted that a farmer
would have any unconsumed time in which to plant crops.
In a recent case 3' the Court of Claims held that the plaintiff could
not rely on an expression of opinion by the Chairman of the Board of
29332 U. S. 380, 68 Sup. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed. 10 (1947).
30 Ibid.
31 Kelley v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 305 (1950). The plaintiff bid to supply
milk to a government hospital. The standard form for the bid contained a
clause that "If any sales tax, . . . adjustinent charge .... or other taxes or
charges are imposed or changed by Congress .... the prices named in this bid
will be increased accordingly. . . .". The chairman of the Board of Awards
said that in his opinion the adjustment charge phrase included adjustment of
prices by the OPA. Ceiling prices were later increased. Plaintiff's increased
costs were disallowed by the Comptroller General of the United States and
the Court of Claims affirmed the denial.
1951]
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Awards concerning the meaning of a provision on a standard govern-
ment form for bids. Under the present rule, the employment of a
lawyer is essential in determining whether the layman is actually re-
ceiving a binding contract when he deals with his government, even
though a government agent assures the citizen that he has.
III
In a majority of the cases involving the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel against the United States, the courts have admitted that re-
covery could be maintained against private companies. There remains
no equitable or logical basis for a distinction. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which lies, innately, at the base of these decisions need not
be disregarded entirely but merely contained within a specific sphere.
A government, when carrying out its proper functions, should not be
molested by suits or threats of suits. This much is conceded. But the
broad contention maintained by the court in the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corporation case,32 based only on the antiquity of a rule rather
than reason should not be allowed to endure. Rather, the courts should
adopt the standard that a government agency or corporation engaging
in a business which by its nature involves commercial transactions is
subject to the same laws and decisions governing private enterprise in
that field. A second solution would be legislation on a national level
similar to that exercised in the tort field.34 While it is well to say that
anyone doing business with the government must turn square corners,33
there appears to be no valid reason why such action should constitute
a one way street.
PAUL BINZAK
32Supra, note 30.
33Supra, note 29, the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson.
34Federal Tort Claims Act, supra, note 9.
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